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The World Textile Multi-Fiber Arrangement: A
Question of Balance
Effective international trade agreements often depend on an institu-
tional framework within which countries with divergent interests can ex-
amine specific trade problems, identify their common interests and work
out mutually acceptable solutions.1 The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)2 has created such an institutional framework by im-
provising numerous procedures.3 One of these procedures gave birth on
December 20, 1973 to the Arrangement Regarding International Trade
in Textiles (hereinafter referred to as the MFA for Multi-Fiber Arrange-
ment).4 On January 1, 1978 the MFA was renewed for a four-year pe-
riod.5
In many respects, the MFA represents the emergence of a new type
of agreement. It illustrates a new theory of trade policy whereby greater
consideration is given to the weaker partners and less power is exercised
by the stronger partners. 6 In this way, the MFA is an instrument favor-
ing a more balanced distribution of trade benefits. 7 However, because of
this characteristic, the MFA is facing increased pressure from the devel-
oped countries.8 In order to survive as a liberal trade arrangement, the
MFA must evolve slowly enough to balance the growth of less-developed
countries (LDCs) with the preservation of the textile industries of the
developed countries.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the MFA in light of its histori-
cal background to demonstrate that it must operate cautiously in order
to contribute to the international textile trade. This note will focus first
on the events leading up to the first textiles agreements which
culminated in the MFA. Next, the MFA's provisions and its perform-
I K. DAM, THE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 15-16 (1970).
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947; 61 Stat. (5) and (6), T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
3 See K. DAM, supra note 1.
4 Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001,
T.I.A.S. No. 7840 [hereinafter cited as MFA].
5 TEXTILE WORLD, Jan. 1978, at 23.
6 Taake & Weiss, The World Textile Arrangement. The Exporter's Viewpoint, 8 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 624, 654 (1974).
7 Id.
8 New York Daily News Record [hereinafter cited as DNR], July 14, 1977; DNR, July 27,
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ance will be examined, with emphasis on the problems the MFA must
overcome. Finally, the future of the MFA will be explored.
I. History
The dominant force leading to the first textile agreements was the
extraordinary growth of textile exports by Japan and other LDCs. Ja-
pan began exporting textiles heavily in the 1950s9 causing other devel-
oped countries to discriminate against its goods.' 0 In the late 1950s,
LDCs also began exporting significant quantities of manufactured goods,
particularly cotton textiles.I
From 1955 until 1965, consumption and production of cotton in the
developed countries declined, whereas the LDCs showed a significant in-
crease. 12 The importance of textile industries to LDCs is shown by the
fact that most undeveloped countries make their industrial debut by
building domestic textile operations. 13 They then depend on the contri-
bution of these operations to the national economy.
Three important events resulted from the fear of "low-wage" im-
ports. First, the contracting parties of the GATT 14 established a working
9 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE MUL-
TIFIBER ARRANGEMENT 1-2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ITC MULTIFIBER].
10 Compare data from [1954-1962] Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS., U.N. Doc. ST/STAT/SER.
G/5-13; K. DAM, supra note 1, at 297; for more information regarding governmental action
against Hong Kong exports see also TEXTILE WORLD, Apr. 1962, at 18.
II Output of cotton fabrics in LDCs increased by more than 70% during the 1953-64 pe-
riod. GATT, A STUDY ON COTTON TEXTILES 17 (1966); GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1972, at 30-31
(1973); K. DAM, supra note I, at 297.
12 GATT, COTTON TEXTILES, supra note 11, at 2.
13 Id. at 7; Allison, The Nontari Trade Barrier Challenge.- Development and Distorthon in the Age
ofInterdependence, 12 TULSA L.J. 1, 24 (1976).
14 The contracting parties of GATT as of April 1977, were:
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Benin
Brazil
Bermuda
Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Empire
Chad
Chile
Congo
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Egypt
Greece
Guyana
Haiti
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Kenya
Korea, Rep. of
Kuwait
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritania
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Rhodesia
Romania
Revanea
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
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party to study the market disruption problem. 15 The working party ad-
vocated a procedural approach to the problem, with emphasis on these
factors: market disruption and a definition thereof, multilateral consul-
tations, orderly expansion of trade, and preservation of existing rights
and obligations under the GATT. 16 However, the working party was
never called on to perform other specific tasks.1 7 The second important
event was the presentation of a petition by the U.S. textile industry to
President Kennedy in 1961.18 The petitioners sought relief under a na-
tional security provision which allows the President to act if he finds an
article is being imported in such quantities as to impair national secur-
ity. 19 Aware that fifteen million jobs depended on the textile industry
and that the battle against inflation depended on strong exports, 20 Presi-
dent Kennedy promised aid to the U.S. textile industry. Shortly thereaf-
ter the third important event occurred when the United States proposed
an international arrangement for the orderly development of the cotton
textile trade.2'
Thereupon followed the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding Inter-
national Trade in Cotton Textiles (STA),22 to extend from October 1,
1961 until September 30, 1962, and the Long-Term Arrangement Re-
garding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA).23 The LTA,
which incorporated most of the STA provisions,24 was extended twice for
Finland Mauritius U.S.A.
France Netherlands Upper Volta
Gabon New Zealand Uruguay
Gambia Nicaragua Yugoslavia
Germany, Fed. Rep. of Niger Zaire
Ghana Nigeria
GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1976, at 84 (1977).
1 GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1972, at 32 (1973); K. DAM, supra note 1, at 298. For the general
mood of the textile industry during this period see genera//y TEXTILE WORLD, July 1960, at 22-
23; TEXTILE WORLD, Aug. 1960, at 18.
16 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 298. See also GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1972, at 32 (1973).
17 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 298.
18 See COMM. ON INT'L TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, IMPORT COMPETITION AND
GOVERNMENTAL RELIEF (pt. 1) 193 (1971) (paper submitted by Stewart, Import Competition and
Governmental Relief208); see also TEXTILE WORLD, July 1961, at 21.
19 Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1955, § 7, 69 Stat. 166 (1955) (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 1862 (1976)); Fulda, Textiles and Voluntaqy Restraints on Steel Protecting United States Indus-
triesfrom Foreign Competition, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 516, 523 (1973).
20 Fulda, supra note 19, at 535-38.
21 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 300; Point 6 of President Kennedy's seven-point program of
assistance for the textile industry read as follows: "to arrange for calling an early conference of
the principal textile exporting and importing countries . . . [to] seek an international under-
standing which will provide a basis for trade that will avoid undue disruption of established
industries." ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 7.
22 The text of the Short-Term Arrangement is set out in GATT, BASIC AGREEMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 10th Supp., 18 (1962).
23 Feb. 9, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2673, T.I.A.S. No. 5240. The agreement was extended by the
Protocol of May 1, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 1337, T.I.A.S. No. 6289 and the Protocol of June 15, 1970,
21 U.S.T. 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 6940.
24 The LTA differed from the STA in three important ways. First, the minimum level to
which exports could be restrained was to be based on a "rolling average calculation" rather
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a total life of eleven years.25 The purpose of the LTA was to provide
slow but steady growth for the LDCs, which would better contribute to
their economic development than would sudden increases. 26 On the
other hand, the LTA was also designed to protect the textile industries in
industrialized countries. 27 It was rather ironic that cotton textiles were
singled out for regulation by the developed countries, for it was here that
the LDCs had the greatest comparative advantage.
The crux of the LTA is to be found in Articles 2, 3 and 4. Article 2
laid down regulations governing the illegal quota restrictions on cotton
textiles which existed at the time of the signing of the LTA.28 These
restrictions were to be progressively relaxed until they were ultimately
eliminated. Article 3, however, dealt with new restraint actions and pro-
vided that they must be justified on the basis of market disruption and be
preceded by consultations. 29 Nevertheless, Article 4 was perhaps the
most important article in the LTA. It provided for mutually acceptable
bilateral agreements which did not fall within the provisions of Article 2
or 3. The bilateral agreements signed under Article 4 usually replaced
existing Article 2 or 3 restrictions and generally covered a wide range of
cotton textiles trade between the two countries concerned.
30
In addition to the cotton textile agreements, there were also forerun-
ners to the multi-fiber coverage of the MFA. In the case of the United
States, these usually took the form of bilateral agreements covering wool
and man-made fiber textile products. 3 1 The agreement with Japan was
than on a fixed base period, as under the STA. Second, the consultation period, during which
only provisional action could be taken, even in the event of critical circumstances, was extended
from thirty to sixty days. Third, because the LTA extended for more than one year, the LTA
contained provisions for an annual percentage increase in the minimum level to which imports
could be kept. ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 10.
25 These extensions are found at International Trade in Cotton Textiles, May 1, 1967,
Protocol, 18 U.S.T. 1337, T.I.A.S. No. 6289 and International Trade in Cotton Textiles, June
15, 1970, Protocol, 21 U.S.T. 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 6940; Allison, supra note 13, at 25.
26 International Trade in Cotton Textiles, Feb. 9, 1962, preamble, 13 U.S.T. 2673,
T.I.A.S. No. 5240; see THE ACTIVITIES OF GATT 1961/62, at 30 (1962); K. DAM, supra note 1,
at 300; see also 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 49 (1965).
27 THE ACTIVITIES OF GATT 1961/62, at 30 (1962); Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 625;
see also 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 49 (1965).
28 THE ACTIVITIES OF GATT 1961/62, at 29-30 (1962); Some illegal quota restrictions
apparently still exist. GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1972, at 23, 44 (1973); Bardan, The Cotton Textile
Agreement 1962-1972, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 8, 12 (1973).
29 Bardan, supra note 28, at 13.
30 Bardan, supra note 28, at 14. During 1971 the United States succeeded in negotiating
bilateral agreements with five Asian countries limiting exports from these countries of wool and
man-made fiber textiles in addition to cotton. ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 12.
31 These agreements were signed in December 1971 and January 1972 and can be found
in the following publications: for the agreement with Japan, see Press Release No. 1, Jan. 4,
1972, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 138 (1972); for the agreement with South Korea, set Press Release
No. 3,Jan. 5, 1972, id. at 162; for the agreement with Hong Kong, see Press Release No. 13, Jan.
13, 1972, id. at 205; for the agreement with the Republic of China, see Press Release No. 306,
Dec. 30, 1971, id. at 101.
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typical.3 2 It covered three years and provided for annual overall limits,
which were to increase slightly over the three-year period. Japan and the
United States were to consult when threats of market disruption arose.
The GATT definition of market disruption was intended to be an inter-
pretive guide. 3
3
II. Creation of the MFA
Although the STA, LTA and bilateral agreements concerning man-
made fibers laid the initial groundwork, the problems inherent in those
agreements and the trend of the textile trade itself provided the major
impetus for the creation of the MFA. The MFA is indeed an example of
a new type of international trade agreement. Five major flaws in the
past textile agreements provided the motivation for its provisions. First,
the LTA did not cover the increasingly important synthetic fibers. 34 Al-
though there were bilateral agreements covering wool and man-made
fibers, the need for multilateral coverage was recognized early in the de-
velopment of the textile trade.35 Imports into the United States of man-
made fiber textiles increased from 31 million pounds in 1960 to 329 mil-
lion pounds in 1970.36
Second, the developing nations disliked the bilateral self-restraint
agreements sanctioned by the LTA and embodied in the man-made fiber
agreements. A multilateral agreement seemed to offer LDCs greater pro-
tection against arbitrary restrictions and also seemed to afford greater
opportunity for economic growth of their synthetic textiles. 37 Cotton
textile producers felt that an arrangement disciplining synthetic textile
products would also provide better safeguards for their market share of
cotton textiles. 38  In fact, as the LDC cotton textile industries become
more self-sufficient, it is increasingly difficult for them to sustain their
cotton export growth to other LDCs.
39
The fourth and fifth factors point to shortcomings in the LTA itself.
It was felt that a new multilateral arrangement could better clarify the
problems of "market disruption" and introduce a more precise and nar-
32 Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles, Jan. 3, 1972, United States-Japan, 23
U.S.T. 3167, T.I.A.S. No. 7495.
33 Fulda, supra note 19, at 525. The preamble of the United States-Japan agreement also
seems to indicate this conclusion. See Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles, supra note
32.
34 From 1953-64, man-made fibers increased their relative share in total fiber consumption
from 18 to 30%. GATT, COTrON TEXTILES, supra note 11, at 13; U.S. Dep't. of Commerce
News, Dec. 27, 1977; Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 626.
35 TEXTILE WORLD, Aug. 1961, at 22.
36 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 12.
37 Prior to 1973, the international textile trade had been beset by an uncontrolled prolifer-
ation of restrictive measures. The MFA was concluded to restore order in the textile trade.
GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1974, at 36 (1975); see also GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1973, at 37 (1974);
Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 626.
38 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 20; Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 626.
39 GATT, CoTrON TEXTILES, supra note 11, at 5.
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row definition of this term.4° In addition, the developing nations also
sought better control of market disruption through an international sur-
veillance body, which did not exist under the LTA. 4 1
In addition to the dissatisfaction of the LDCs with the pre-existing
arrangement, the trends in the textile trade also contributed to the crea-
tion of the MFA. The cotton and yarn trade grew slowly from 1962-1970
as the importance of natural fibers decreased. 4 2 Statistics show that cot-
ton exports by major LDCs began a decline in 1969 which continued
into the 1970s. 43 In fact, by 1970, man-made fibers constituted forty per-
cent of the fabric imports of western industrialized countries. 4 4 LDCs
exhibited negligible production of synthetics in the early 1960s, but
LDCs and developed countries substantially increased synthetic exports
in the early 1970s. 45 Total imports of man-made fiber textiles fluctuated
from 1.8 billion equivalent square yards in 1969 to 4.3 billion equivalent
square yards in 1972.46
The United States feared that this tidal wave of imports would re-
sult in the loss of thousands of jobs. 4 7 However, the LDCs were also
concerned, for this movement from natural to man-made fiber produc-
tion tended to favor the industrialized nations. The need for heavy capi-
tal investment and a high level of technological know-how in order to
produce large quantities of synthetics meant that the comparative ad-
vantage would shift from the LDCs (where cotton was the staple) back to
the developed countries. 48 This fear was well-founded, for the "devel-
oped market economies" were literally swamping the "developing mar-
ket economies" in exports of synthetics and regenerated fibers. 49 Hence,
the textile trade in the 1970s created fears on both sides of the negotiat-
ing table which spurred the creation of the MFA.
The preparatory work in drafting the MFA was started in June 1972
by the Working Party on Trade and Textiles within the GATT.50 At the
end of July 1973, the GATT Council agreed to convert the working
40 The LDCs believed that safeguard action should be taken only in the case of proven
actual material injury to domestic production, not in cases of potential injury, and that such
action must take into account the injury that might be caused to export industries in developing
countries. GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1974, at 24 (1975); Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 626.
41 GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1974, at 23 (1975); Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 626.
42 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 19; Bardan, supra note 28, at 18-21.
43 Statistics for Hong Kong and India illustrate this trend. [1970-1971 to 1975] Y.B. INT'L
TRADE STATS., U.N. Doe. ST/ESA/STAT/SER. G/19-24.
44 Bardan, supra note 28, at 22-23.
45 An examination of India, Hong Kong, Malaysia and South Korea (major LDC export-
ers) shows this trend. In addition, the U.S. synthetic exports jumped over 400% between 1962
and 1974. [1963-1975] Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS., U.N. Doe. ST/ESA/STAT/SER. G/14-24.
46 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 26.
47 Hearings on Trade Act of 1970 Before the Senate Fitance Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (pt.
1), at 226 (1970); Fulda, supra note 19, at 256; TEXTILE WORLD, Oct. 1966, at 32.
48 Bardan, supra note 28, at 23.
49 [1972-73] Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS. 994, U.N. Doe. ST/STAT/SER. G/22; [1975] 2
Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS. 72, U.N. Doe. ST/ESA/STAT/SER. G/24/Add. 1.
50 Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 650.
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group into a negotiating group, and called upon it to reach a mutually
satisfactory arrangement on trade in textiles by the end of 1973.51
Five major factors permitted a workable solution. First, all partici-
pants in the MFA negotiations agreed that the restrictive measures still
in existence under the LTA were unsatisfactory, and they were willing to
compromise to reach a better agreement. 52 Second, the MFA was con-
fined to one product group and a limited period of validity. 53 Third, the
possibility of a comprehensive all-fiber arrangement appealed to many
participants and provided the incentive for them to compromise. 54
Fourth, the negotiations were restricted only to those countries with a
direct interest in establishing an agreement. 55 Finally, the strategy of
running the textile negotiations separately from the general GATT sys-
tem proved to be successful. 56
The drafters of the MFA tried to give due consideration to the inter-
ests of both the developed countries and the LDCs. Article 3 recognizes
the importance of economic development in textiles for LDCs, while Ar-
ticle 4 recognizes the need to protect the domestic textile industries of
industrialized states.5 7 This conflict provided the basis for the creation of
the MFA, and it continues to challenge the viability and effectiveness of
the MFA today. An examination of the MFA's major articles will show
how the perspectives of each participant to the MFA negotiations in
1973 actually shaped the provisions of the agreement.
The Preamble and Article 1 of the MFA set out its purposes and
objectives. 58 The Preamble notes the unsatisfactory textile situation and
the undesirability of restrictive and discriminatory measures. It also
stresses the need for a multilateral framework which will facilitate eco-
nomic expansion and promote the development of LDCs. Furthermore,
full regard for the principles and objectives of the GATT is to be main-
tained in carrying out the purposes of the MFA. Article 1 states that the
MFA's practical measures are aimed at expanding trade and reducing
barriers ". . . while at the same time ensuring the orderly and equitable
development of this trade and avoidance of disruptive effects in individ-
ual markets. . . ,,59 Article 1 stresses the economic and social develop-
ment of LDCs, while also urging that there be no interruption or
discouragement of the autonomous industrial adjustment processes of
participating countries. This indicates a recognition of the conflicting
concerns of both sides of the textile-producing world.
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the MFA deal with the specific actions which
51 GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1973, at 37 (1974).
52 GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1974, at 36 (1975); Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 650-51.
53 Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 650-51.
54 TEXTILE WORLD, May 1973, at 25-26.
55 GATr ACTIVITIES IN 1974, at 36 (1975); Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 650-51.
56 Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 650-51.
57 MFA, supra note 4, arts. 3, 4.
58 Id. Preamble, art. 1.
59 Id. art. 1.
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can be taken. Article 2 provides that all existing unilateral quantitative
restrictions and bilateral agreements which have a restrictive effect must
be eliminated unless they are justified under the provisions of the GATT.
Full opportunity for bilateral consultation should be allowed in order to
remove these restrictive measures. 60
Article 3, the provision dealing with solutions to market disruption,
states that it should be used sparingly and only in those instances where a
precise product is causing market disruption, as defined in Annex A.61
Annex A states that market disruption exists when there is serious dam-
age to domestic producers or an actual threat thereof. Factors which
indicate market disruption include decreasing market share, declining
profits, poor export performance, unemployment, increased volume of
imports, lower production, and under-utilization of capacity, productiv-
ity and investments. None of these factors alone are determinative of
whether market disruption exists. Annex A notes that the factors causing
market disruption generally appear in this combination: (1) a sharp and
substantial increase or imminent increase of imports of particular prod-
ucts from particular sources, and (2) offering of these products at prices
substantially below those prevailing for similar goods of comparable
quality in the market of the exporting company.6 2 Part III of Article 3
best illustrates how a determination of market disruption is to fit into the
general purposes of the MFA:
In considering questions of "market disruption" account shall be taken
of the interests of the exporting country, especially in regard to its stage
of development, the importance of the textile sector of the economy, the
employment situation, overall balance of trade in textiles, trade balance
with the importing country concerned and overall balance of pay-
ments.
6 3
Article 3 permits MFA participants to complain of market disrup-
tion and enter into consultations with the responsible exporting country.
If the participants reach a mutual understanding that restrictions are
necessary, then a restraint level on imports shall be set according to An-
nex B of the MFA. If no understanding can be reached, the complaining
party is allowed to set a level not less than the level provided in Annex
B.64 Annex B specifies that Article 3 limitations on imports shall usually
not be less than the level of imports during the twelve-month period ter-
minating two months prior to a request for consultation. When restraint
levels remain in force for additional twelve-month periods, limitations
shall be increased by not less than six percent unless evidence clearly
indicates that market disruption will recur. 65 Whenever restraint levels
60 Id. art. 2.
61 Id. art. 3.
62 Id. annex A.
63 Id. art. 3, part III.
64 Id. annex B.
65 This is the interpretation of the U.S. International Trade Commission. ITC MUL-
TIFIBER, supra note 9, at 17.
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are set, the Textile Surveillance Body (TSB)66 shall examine the level
and make recommendations to the parties, to the Textiles Committee
67
of the MFA and to the GATT Council. Article 3 also provides for imple-
mentation of restraints in emergency situations. Measures adopted
under Article 3 are introduced for limited periods not to exceed one year,
subject to renewal or extension. 68
Article 4 of the MFA allows participating countries to conclude bi-
lateral agreements which combat real risks of market disruption.69 The
base levels and growth rates contained in these bilateral agreements
should be more liberal than measures reached through Article 3 proce-
dures. 70 The bilateral agreements shall be designed to facilitate exports
and assure substantial flexibility for the conduct of trade. Hence, Article
4 retains the bilateral arrangement, the major method of stifling market
disruption under the LTA.
Many of the other provisions reflect the perspectives represented
around the MFA negotiating table. 7' For instance, Hong Kong's wish to
keep its high quota level is reflected in Article 6.2, which provides that
quotas shall not cause undue prejudice to established suppliers or create
serious distortions in existing patterns of trade.72 The special cotton in-
terests are represented in Article 6.4 which gives special consideration to
cotton. 73 Countries with small exports are protected from heavy re-
straints under Article 6.3. 74 Article 5 calls for reasonable and flexible
administration of quota allocation procedures, in response to many par-
ticipants' complaints that the procedures were too complicated to admin-
ister.75 To satisfy importing countries, circumvention of exporting levels
is checked by Article 8.76 Those countries with high import levels and
66 The TSB consists of an independent chairman and eight members so chosen as to con-
stitute a balanced membership representative of the countries participating in the Arrange-
ment. The role of the TSB is to supervise the implementation of the Arrangement. Its main
functions are to review all restrictions, whether unilaterally or bilaterally imposed, to determine
whether they are fully consistent with the Arrangement, and to provide a forum for the settle-
ment of disputes. Membership on the TSB is rotated annually. GAT ACTIVITIES IN 1976, at
51 (1977).
67 The Textiles Committee, to which the TSB reports, comprises all countries participat-
ing in the Arrangement. As of April 1977, they number forty-two (counting the nine members
of the EEC as one) and account for most of the world trade in textiles. GATT ACTIVITIES IN
1976, at 51 (1977).
68 MFA, supra note 4, art. 3.
69 Id. art. 4.
70 However, the EEC and United States textile industries indicate that the annual growth
rate contained in bilateral agreements should be lowered to under 6% in order to protect their
domestic textile industries. See DNR, supra note 8, July 27, 1977; id. Oct. 10, 1977; Hearing on
US Trade Defwt and the Textile Apparel Industy Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (Nov. 7, 1977) (Statement of Burlington Industries, Inc.) [hereinafter cited
as Statement of Burlington Industries, Inc.].
71 Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 649-50.
72 MFA, supra note 4, art. 6.2.
73 Id. art. 6.4.
74 Id. art. 6.3.
75 Id. art. 5.
76 Id. art. 8.
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low domestic production (such as Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Swit-
zerland) are protected by Article 1.2 which requires avoidance of dam-
age to their marginally viable textile industry. 77 Finally, the desire of
most developing countries for the most favorable solution possible is em-
bodied in Articles 13.178 and 13.2.79 These provisions link the MFA with
the general provisions of the GATT and do not permit textile import
restrictions incompatible with the GATT obligations.
What improvements does the MFA provide over the previous LTA?
The two major improvements are the narrowing of the definition of mar-
ket disruption and the addition of the Textile Surveillance Body. In con-
trast to the LTA, disruptions can now be determined by means of the
detailed list of criteria in Annex A. The definition of "market disrup-
tion" found in Annex A should facilitate free trade instead of creating
more non-tariff trade barriers by setting stringent requirements for a
finding of market disruption. Annex A requires "serious damage" and
provides an extensive list of factors to be used in making the determina-
tion. In addition, the interests of both sides are taken into account in
reaching a result.
The innovative Textile Surveillance Body (TSB)is to be balanced
and broadly representative so as to fairly supervise the MFA.80 The TSB
is a standing body able to meet frequently and at very short notice.!'
"Its principal aim is to seek conciliation and to use its good offices to that
end."'82 It follows procedural rules aimed at ensuring equity of treatment
when it must consider a dispute between a country which has a member
on the TSB and a country which does not.83 Hence, the TSB provides
the supervision necessary to implement the MFA effectively and to solve
conflicts on a multilateral basis. This supervision was lacking in the
LTA.
The LTA also experienced several problems which the MFA was
designed to overcome. In the first place, exporters could elude the LTA
by blending natural fibers in order to create man-made fibers.8 4 Ironi-
cally, this meant that the LTA, an agreement to facilitate cotton trade,
accelerated the shift to man-made fibers. The MFA, however, covers
both natural and man-made fibers and hence does not allow similar cir-
cumvention of its measures or purposes. The LDCs perceived the restric-
tive actions of the United States to be another problem.8 5 The United
States effected a far greater number of LTA Article 3 restraints than
77 Id. art. 1.2.
78 Id. art. 13.1.
79 Id. art. 13.2.
80 Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 628.
81 GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1974, at 37 (1975).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Evidence of this practice can be found in the increased exports of synthetics and
regenerated fibers. [1972-73] Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS., supra note 49, at 994.
85 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 307.
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anticipated, many of which caused goods stopped at customs to be sold
at distress prices.8 6 Article 3 of the MFA seeks to prevent this by de-
manding that, in light of the effect on the exporting country, there be a
clear case of market disruption before restraints are imposed. Addition-
ally, the Surveillance Body reviews the restraint.
A problem was also created by the LTA's failure to publicize many
understandings adopted by the Cotton Textiles Committee.8 7 This se-
crecy prevented many private exporters from preparing for the future.
Hopefully, Articles 7, 10 and 11 of the MFA will solve this problem.
Article 7 provides for the exchange of information between participating
countries,88 and Articles 10 and 11 provide for the submission of reports
by the Textiles Committee and Textiles Surveillance Body to the GATT
Council.8 9
The greatest problem with the LTA, however, was its negative effect
on the world economy. It tended to inhibit the economies of both the
LDCs and the developed countries. The modus operandi of the LTA was
essentially bilateral, with import restrictions imposed by means of na-
tional quotas based on past trade.9° This system not only served to in-
hibit exporting countries but it also provided a protected and secure
market for the less efficient countries. Such a system tends to be self-
perpetuating, as evidenced by the eleven year life of the LTA: ". . . the
LTA has been converted from a temporary procedure for rational. adjust-
ment in the international trade of cotton textiles into a permanent pro-
tectionist device to guarantee inefficient domestic textile industries a
share of their countries' markets." 9 1
The LTA also adversely affected the efficient domestic textile indus-
tries of the developed countries. For instance, cotton imports in the
United States more than doubled from 1968 through 1974.92 The
United States showed a trade deficit in cotton textiles every year from
1968 through 1974.93 Representatives of textile producing states empha-
sized that the increase in imports was hurting cotton producers and cost-
86 An example of this involved Hong Kong exports to the United States. TEXTILE
WORLD, Oct. 1961, at 22.
87 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 303, n.24.
8 MFA, supra note 4, art. 7.
89 Id. arts. 10, 11.
90 Bardan, supra note 28, at 32; TEXTILE WORLD, Oct. 1961, at 22.
91 Allison, supra note 13, at 25.
92 Compare Country Tables, Imports by Commodities to the Standard International Trade
Classification, Revised, [1972-19731 Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS., supra note 49 with Country Ta-
bles, Imports by Commodities According to the Standard International Trade Classification,
Revised, [1975] 1 Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS. 958, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER. G/24.
93 Compare Country Tables, Imports by Commodities According to the Standard Interna-
tional Trade Classification, Revised, [1972-1973] Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS., id. at 798 with
Country Tables, Exports by Commodities According to the Standard International Trade Clas-
sification, Revised, id. at 801 and Country Tables, Imports by Commodities According to the
Standard International Trade Classification, Revised, [1975] 1 Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS., id. at
959 with Country Tables, Exports by Commodities According to the Standard International
Trade Classification, Revised, id. at 961.
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ing their citizens jobs. 94
III. The Performance of the MFA
The major challenge facing the MFA is to maintain an equilibrium
between the economic growth of the LDCs and the preservation of the
textile industries of the developed countries. The MFA must continue to
promote the economic growth of developing nations in order to enhance
international trade; but it is equally important that it progress slowly so
as not to disrupt the economies of industrialized nations. A tipping of
this balance may jeopardize the entire efficacy of the multilateral trade
agreement. An examination of the four major problems of the MFA il-
lustrates how tenuous this balance is.
The first problem is the negative impact of the MFA on domestic
textile production in developed nations. Statistics show that U.S. im-
ports of cotton textiles and man-made fibers have been substantially
higher during the MFA years than they were during the LTA and STA
years.95 This is a strong indication that the MFA is not allowing the
United States to invoke the many restraints which were common under
the LTA. In fact, the total imports of cotton, wool and man-made fibers
in the United States jumped from 3,827.5 million square yards
equivalent in 1975 to 5,138.4 million square yards equivalent in 1976.96
A study made by the textile industry projects that imports will double in
volume from 1976 to 1985. 9 7
Whereas total imports have jumped over 300% between 1964 and
1976,98 it is interesting to note that the imports of natural textiles, cotton
and wool, have declined. Cotton yarn and miscellaneous cotton declined
from 1964 until 1975, the first year of the MFA.99 The total imports of
wool fell by over 40% during the LTA period from 1964 through 1975. 100
These trends have been reversed, however, during the first two years of
the MFA; between 1975 and 1976 cotton and wool imports increased
over 50% and 33%, respectively. 0 1
Although it is apparent that the MFA has positively affected U.S.
textile imports during 1975 and 1976, the influx of man-made fibers is
increasing at the expense of natural textile imports. Total imports of
man-made fibers into the United States have jumped almost 1000% dur-
ing the 1964-1976 period. 10 2 The most significant jump has been during
the 1975-1976 MFA period, however, when man-made fiber imports in-
94 TEXTILE WORLD, Oct. 1969, at 32.
95 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 21, 26; U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE NEWS, Sept. 13, 1977,
at 3.
96 U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE NEWS, Sept. 13, 1977, at 3.
97 Statement of Burlington Industries, Inc., supra note 70, at 3.
98 U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE NEWS, Sept. 13, 1977, at 3.
99 Id.
too Id..
101 Id.
102 Id.
WORLD TEXTILE MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT
creased by over 25%. 103 In fact, the jump from 1975 to 1976 almost
doubled the entire amount of man-made fiber imports in 1964.
These imports compete directly with U.S. textile products and often
mean the loss of jobs for U.S. textile workers. It has been indicated that
imports now claim over 10% of the U.S. textile and apparel market and
have already eliminated approximately 400,000 textile jobs. 0 4 The pro-
jection for the period from 1976 through 1985 is that increased imports
will cause the loss of almost 600,000 textile jobs and 1.6 million jobs
which are indirectly connected with the textile industry. 0 5
A conflict does exist over what the statistics actually mean. First, it
is apparent that U.S. domestic textile production is substantially higher
today than before the MFA. 10 6 Alternatively, it is also obvious that the
annual U.S. textile trade deficit has increased during the MFA period. 107
Thus, the MFA appears to have affected the U.S. domestic textile situa-
tion in two contrasting ways. Nevertheless, the key fact is that the U.S.
"import/domestic use" ratio has increased during the MFA years." °8
This means that domestically produced textiles are losing ground to im-
ports.
Negative impacts on developed textile industries stem from two
other sources. First, it is contended that the MFA does not cover 30% of
current U.S. textile imports, much of which comes from developing
countries. 0 9 These countries, which are not covered by any bilateral ar-
rangement under the MFA, will be able to increase their capacity at a
faster rate than other nations and further threaten developed nations'
markets. Second, there is the possibility that textiles will not be ex-
empted from tariff reductions in the present Tokyo Round of multilat-
eral trade negotiations.i ° If this occurs, the U.S. textile industry notes
that imports would further increase."
For these reasons, the developed nations are arguing for a reduction
in the guaranteed growth rate provided in Article 3, Annex B. The EEC
103 Id.
104 Statement of Burlington Industries, Inc., supra note 70, at 1.
105 The textile industry points out that minorities comprise 25% of the industry's employees
and women 65%. These are the groups that would be hurt most by layoffs caused by increased
imports. Id. at 3-4.
106 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 18.
107 Statement of Burlington Industries, Inc., supra note 70, at 1-2; see U.S. DEP'T. COMMERCE
NEWS, Dec. 27, 1977, at 4.
108 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 33.
109 Statement of Burlington Industries, Inc., supra note 70, at 2.
110 The initial agreement to open a new round of ambitious trade negotiations was reached
at a ministerial meeting held in Tokyo in September 1973 and embodied in a document known
as the Tokyo Declaration. The negotiations are to cover both tariff and non-tariff obstacles to
the trade in a wide range of products and to consider improvements in GATT itself. GATT
ACTIVITIES IN 1973, at 5 (1974). The negotiations entered one substantive phase in February
1975. GAT'T ACTIVITIES IN 1976, at 9 (1977). The substantive negotiations have been continu-
ing on a regular basis; exemption of textiles from tariff reductions is one topic of discussion. See
DNR, supra note 8, Nov. 30, 1977.
1I1 Statement of Burlington Industries, Inc., supra note 70, at 5.
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has argued for a 6% average growth rate based on 1976 volume." 2
The total import growth rate of 6% would be derived by reducing
the growth of the most sensitive products below the 6% rate and cor-
resondingly increasing the growth of less critical products above the 6%
rate. The EEC also wants to tie import growth to a percentage of actual
consumption growth rather than to existing shares of the total market. 113
Although the U.S. government has indicated that it favors the existing
MFA growth rate," 4 the U.S. textile industry has shown a desire to allow
imports to grow only at the slower growth of the U.S. domestic mar-
ket. 1 ' 5 The textile industry apparently feels that this rate will lessen the
negative impact of imports on domestic textile production.
The second problem facing the MFA is allowing the textile econo-
mies of the LDCs to develop at a sufficient rate. For example, the devel-
oping market economies showed steady growth in cotton fabric exports
from 1968 to 1973, but the MFA seems to have slowed this growth
rate." 6  It is recognized that the LDCs have enormous economic
problems, 117 but the proposals of developed nations will only augment
these problems by harming the LDCs' export industries." 8 The de-
creased growth rate plan of the EEC will entail reductions in the market
share of textile products by the major textile exporters. 19 Spokesmen for
Hong.Kong say its textile industry will not be able to grow in the face of
restrictive attitudes in major markets like Europe and the United
States. 120
These restrictive attitudes have other repercussions as well. First,
some LDCs have recently made substantial investments in new produc-
tion capacity and may suffer significant levels of capacity under-utiliza-
tion. 121 The reduced growth rate proposal creates an additional problem
by basing the growth rate on 1976 figures. 122 The 1976 levels of exports
are lower than 1977 levels. This too will cut into the development of
LDCs. For example, Brazil had an exceptionally poor cotton crop and
export year in 1976.123 By basing its growth rate on these figures, Brazil
will face a substantially greater restriction on exports which could cripple
its textile industry. Hence, it is apparent that the restrictions on the
LDC textile industries may prevent them from contributing to their
112 DNR, supra note 8, Oct. 10, 1977.
113 Id.
114 Id. July 21, 1977.
115 Statement of Burhhgton Industries, Inc., supra note 70, at 5.
116 [1972-19731 Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS., supra note 49, at 1044.
117 DNR, supra note 8, July 12, 1977.
118 Id. July 19, 1977.
119 Id. Oct. 10, 1977. The EEC proposal asks Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan to
accept actual volume reductions in the 15 to 20% region in order to free quantities for distribu-
tion to smaller exporters. Id. Oct. 12, 1977.
120 Id. Nov. 30, 1977.
121 South Korea, India and Brazil are prime examples. Id. Oct. 13, 1977.
122 Id. Oct. 12, 1977.
123 Id. Nov. 7, 1977.
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countries' economic development. "The problem is to find solutions that
take into account both the dependence of developing countries on textile
exports and the very real problems that are occurring in the importing
countries, particularly in Western Europe."' 124
The third major problem results from the weakness of the MFA it-
self. First, participants under the MFA expect their interests to be pro-
tected through the effective supervision of the Textile Surveillance Body.
However, there are difficulties with the TSB because no accord has yet
been reached regarding its budget or personnel policy. In order to oper-
ate effectively, the TSB must have a guaranteed budget and a sufficiently
large and capable staff.' 25 The TSB must be able to make full use of its
authority as agreed upon in the arrangement and it must gain political
standing so as to exercise its influence effectively. 126 So far, the motiva-
tion and commitment of the MFA members appears to be providing an
effective surveillance body. In 1975, for instance, the TSB reviewed some
fifty bilateral agreements and a small number of unilateral reductions. 127
Such commitment and comprehensive review will be necessary in the
future to overcome the lack of an accord over the operations of the TSB.
Another possible weakness in the MFA could be its operation within
the GATT framework. The major difference between the GATT and
the MFA is that Articles 3 and 1 1 of the GATT disallow internal quanti-
tative restrictions.1 28 Tensions between the GATT and the LTA could
also carry over to the MFA. For instance, the GATT places the adjust-
ment burden (in terms of tariffs) on importing countries whereas the
MFA allows the burden to be shifted by the importer, through restraints,
to the exporting country. 2 9 These shifting burdens might strain the
MFA's ability to abide by the general purposes of the GATT.
In addition, the relationship between the MFA and the GATT
raises a strictly legal question: if an exporting country were to claim that
an MFA restraint was an illegal quantitative restriction, would retalia-
tory action under Article 23 of GAT' 130 be justified? This would be
particularly important if the exporting country was not a participating
country under the MFA and could not be said to have waived any of its
GATT rights.' 3 1 In addition, Article 13 of the GATT states that all re-
strictions must be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to all countries
participating in the GATT.132 Restraints under the MFA obviously vio-
late this principle.
124 London Financial Times, July 26, 1977, at 33.
125 Taake & Weiss, supra note 6, at 653.
126 Id.
127 GATT ACTIvITIES IN 1975, at 45 (1976).
128 61 Stat. (part 5) A18-A19, A32-A34; T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 645, 653-54; 55 U.N.T.S. 206,
224-28.
129 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 306.
130 61 Stat. (part 5) A64-A65; T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 671; 55 U.N.T.S. 266-68.
131 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 307.
132 61 Stat. (part 5) A40-A43; T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 657-59; 55 U.N.T.S. 266-68.
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Nevertheless, the conflict between the GATT and the MFA is ame-
liorated by the operation of Part IV of the GATT. In particular, Part IV
is designed to raise the living standards of less-developed contracting par-
ties by positive efforts.1a3 Article 38 provides for joint action by the con-
tracting. parties within the framework of the GATT to further this
objective. In particular, this Article suggests arrangements regarding pri-
mary products (such as textiles) and other feasible methods for ex-
panding trade.' 3 4 Thus, Article 38 is actually authorization to enter into
an agreement such as the MFA.
It is important to note, however, that the reduction of trade barriers
is the priority of Article 37 of Part IV.'3 5 This again reflects the GATT
attitude that fewer trade barriers mean greater trade expansion. How-
ever, in some circumstances it may be necessary to install short-term bar-
riers in order to achieve long-term freedom of trade. This presents the
most crucial issue regarding the MFA: whether safeguard measures that
legitimate an increase in barriers to trade may not paradoxically contrib-
ute in an important measure to the reduction of trade barriers and to the
promotion of international trade. 1 36 Some restrictions are needed to pro-
tect the domestic textile industries of developed countries. By doing so,
they allow the industrialized nations to contribute to world textile
growth and also ward off recrimination directed at the exporting LDCs.
The MFA establishes safeguards to ensure that the trade barriers it
sanctions do reduce trade restrictions and promote international trade.
Embodied within these safeguards are refutations to the GATT's three
reasons for disapproval of quantitative restrictions. First, quantitative
restrictions permit the local market to be isolated from the discipline of
the world market.137 The MFA overcomes this characteristic by requir-
ing its restraints to be of one-year duration only and subject to review by
the Textiles Surveillance Body. This ensures that the particular isolated
market will constantly be scrutinized in light of the needs of the other
participating countries. Second, quantitative restrictions lend themselves
peculiarly well to hidden discriminatory application, since administra-
tive application plays a major role in their implementation. 3 8 Again the
MFA Surveillance Body provides a check on such discrimination. Fi-
nally, quantitative restrictions make for the regimentation of trade at the
expense of a flexible textile market. This is because they can be rapidly
adjusted, thus permitting a high degree of precision in determining im-
133 17 (part 2) U.S.T. 1978-80; T.I.A.S. No. 6139; 572 U.N.T.S. 322-32.
134 17 (part 2) U.S.T. 1983-84; T.I.A.S. No. 6139; 572 U.N.T.S. 328-30.
135 17 (part 2) U.S.T. 1980-83; T.I.A.S. No. 6139; 572 U.N.T.S. 324-28.
136 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 296. One indication of this is expressed in statistics showing
that the exports of "developing market economies" were up in the MFA's first year over the
preceding year. [19751 2 Y.B. INT'L TRADE STATS., supra note 49, at 122.
137 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 148. Japan is recognized as one market which became isolated
from the world market for a period of time U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE NEWS, Jan. 5, 1978, at
6.
138 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 149; see GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1961/62, at 25 (1962).
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port levels. 139 This criticism may be answered by the MFA's efforts to
facilitate economic expansion. That such expansion should be "orderly"
does not mean that the textile market will not be flexible. In Annex B
the MFA provides for at least a 6% growth rate on imports which were
restrained the previous year.' 40 Although the amount of the growth rate
is subject to much controversy, all countries seem to accept its existence
as important for the MFA.
The fourth major problem is the agreements entered into outside
the MFA framework. For example, the MFA must avoid voluntary ex-
port restraints entered into by a country which is seeking to prevent im-
porting countries from imposing restraints on its imports. Japan
voluntarily decreased textile exports to the United States in 1961 because
it feared that an eight cent per pound duty would be imposed by the
United States.' 4 ' Such a restraint would be outside the GATT and
MFA framework and threatens worldwide trade relations because it en-
courages a nation to enter into a discriminatory trade arrangement.
4 2
Also, such restraints gradually create an artificial level of imports which
will eventually be challenged. For example, Japan's voluntary restraints
opened the door for other exporters to increase their share of the U.S.
market, 143 forcing Japan to later demand higher imports into the United
States in order to regain its market share. This further strains the im-
porting country's textile market. Hopefully, the motivation of the MFA
parties and their commitment to accept the MFA's obligations will pre-
vent voluntary restraints in the future.
In addition, the polarization of negotiating positions must be re-
solved to prevent the LDC-developed country balance from tipping. In
the recent renegotiation of the MFA, there were stark conflicts of posi-
tion. By demanding a reduction in the levels and growth of imports, the
EEC was in direct conflict with most LDCs.144 At times it appeared that
the EEC, the United States and Japan were squared off against the
LDCs, 45 but at other times the EEC was upset at U.S. "meddling,"
when the United States attempted to mediate the conflict.' 46 Even the
EEC countries themselves could not agree on negotiating strategy. At
one point, Great Britain threatened to veto any EEC action because it
felt that the EEC's stance was too soft. "47 And while the EEC requested
only reasonable departures from the MFA, France was clamoring for
major changes in the Agreement which would meet its hardline
139 K. DAM, supra note 1, at 149.
140 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at A-36.
141 TEXTILE WORLD, Jan. 1961, at 18-19.
142 Allison, supra note 13, at 28.
143 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 2.
144 DNR, supra note 8, July 21, 1977 and Nov. 7, 1977.
145 Id. July 19, 1977.
146 Id. Nov. 11, 1977.
147 Id. Nov. 8, 1977.
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stance. 148 Finally, the bilateral agreements which the EEC attempted to
conclude with various LDCs continually broke down due to alleged ir-
reconcilable differences. 4 9 Such polarization at the MFA renegotiation
not only threatens the necessary equilibrium which must be maintained,
but also threatens the very existence of the MFA.' 50
The above four problems are a serious threat to the balance between
LDCs and developed importers under the MFA. The battle to maintain
this equilibrium also continues in the negotiation of the bilateral agree-
ment. As of October 1, 1977, the United States had bilateral agreements
limiting imports of textiles under the MFA with eighteen countries.1 5 '
During 1976, imports from the eighteen countries with which the United
States had agreements accounted for 82% of total cotton textile imports,
53% of wool textile imports and 75% of man-made fiber textile im-
ports.' 52 Thus, it is apparent that the bilateral agreement within the
MFA is an important instrument for the world's major textile importer.
U.S. bilateral agreements have followed the liberal rule required under
Article 4 of the MFA. Generally, they have allowed 6 to 7% increases in
limitations on textile products.' 53 (The MFA growth rate is a minimum
of 6%). Hence one can conclude that the U.S. bilateral agreements have
helped the LDC exporters expand their textile economy. In light of the
pleas of the textile industry, it may be necessary to allow a smaller
growth rate in order to bring the U.S.-LDC trade relationship into equi-
librium.
By scrutinizing a typical bilateral agreement on textile trade, 1ie.,
the agreement between the United States and Singapore (referred to as
the MFA agreement)' 54 concerning trade in cotton, wool and man-made
fibers, one can again see the impact of the MFA. Before the MFA was
signed, the United States was committed to two textile agreements with
Singapore (referred to as the LTA agreements): one agreement con-
cerned trade in cotton textiles' 55 and another involved trade in wool and
man-made fiber textile products.' 56 The signing of the MFA was the
impetus for the change to a more recent treaty.
The existing agreement between the United States and Singapore
illustrates the difference in approach between the MFA and LTA. For
example, in the case of extension of import restrictions beyond one year,
148 Id. July 27, 1977.
149 A report of the EEC-Hong Kong breakdown is found in DNR, supra note 8, Nov. 9,
1977; a report of another EEC-Hong Kong breakdown and the EEC-India breakdown is found
in DNR, supra note 8, Nov. 22, 1977.
150 On several occasions, MFA negotiators indicated that a particular impasse may doom
renewal of the MFA. See DNR, supra note 8, July 13, 1977; id. July 14, 1977; ia. July 20, 1977;
id. Oct. 17, 1977; id'. Nov. 23, 1977.
151 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra note 9, at 38.
152 Id. at 39.
153 Id. at 41.
154 May 21, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 928, T.I.A.S. No. 8080.
155 Jan. 21, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 203, T.XA.S. No. 7787.
156 Jan. 29, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 208, T.I.A.S. No. 7788.
WORLD TEXTILE MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT
the LTA agreements provided for a 5% increase in imports over the first
year of restrictions for man-made fibers and 1% for wool products. How-
ever, the MFA agreement provides for an increase of 6.25% for man-
made fibers; if wool imports are given only a 1% increase, then the re-
maining 5.25% allotted to wool can be distributed to cotton and man-
made articles. Furthermore, the "carry-over" and "carry forward" levels
differ under both sets of agreements. 157 Under the LTA agreements, the
carry-over and carry forward surplus was held at 5% of the receiving
year's applicable limits. However, the MFA agreement allows as much
as an 11% increase.
Other differences also exist in the two sets of U.S.-Singapore agree-
ments. The MFA agreement uses the language of the MFA itself to de-
fine what specific elements constitute cotton, wool and man-made
textiles. In an additional clause not contained in the LTA agreements,
the United States promises not to invoke Article 3 of the MFA during the
life of the U.S.-Singapore agreement. This should mean that the United
States is precluded from setting restraints to combat market disruption
caused by imports from Singapore, thus assuring Singapore of an ex-
panding market for textiles.
However, statistics show that although Singapore's textile imports
into the United States were substantially higher in 1976 than 1975, they
were still well below the level of 1973 (prior to the MFA). 158 These
figures indicate that the U.S.-Singapore agreement does allow for expan-
sion of textile imports but that it also may curb potential growth. Rever-
sion to bilateral agreements is not contemplated by the MFA, but
bilateral agreements authorized by Article 4 appear to be serving a useful
purpose. If expansion and restriction of textile imports can be controlled
to suit the needs of both parties, then the MFA shows promise as a bal-
ancing instrument.
After examining the several obstacles which the MFA must face to
survive, one cannot overlook the positive aspects of the MFA which are
already working to set an equilibrium in the world textile trade.
One area where the MFA and the GATT work well together is the
adjustment assistance program. Article 18 of the GATT, aimed at
LDCs, provides for governmental assistance to industries which are ad-
versely affected by market disruption. In addition, adjustment assistance
can be used by developed countries to adapt to market conditions and
revive domestic textile industries.159 Despite a tendency to protect ineffi-
157 During any year, carry-over involves the use of an unused portion of imports for the
previous year and carry forward involves the use of a portion of imports to be allowed for the
succeeding agreement year.
158 Statistics on Singapore's cotton imports into the United States are found in ITC MUL-
TIFIBER, supra note 9, at C-46; man-made fiber imports are found in ITC MULTIFIBER, supra
note 9, at C-64.
159 GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1970/71 at 31 (1971); ste also U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE MULT.
TRADE NEG. NEWS, July-August 1977, at 4, id. August-September 1977, at 4.
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cient domestic industries, such assistance can be justified. It preserves
intact the benefits consumers receive from international competition. Al-
though this aid to inefficient industry runs counter to the MFA's objec-
tives, government assistance is usually applied only in cases where the
injury occurs in only a small portion of the industry. In this manner it
reflects a domestic caretaking responsibility without sacrificing the
MFA's objectives to further efficient international textile production. In
addition, adjustment assistance alleviates some of the impact of heavy
imports and allows developed countries to reduce their trade barriers. 1 60
Developing countries depend on this so that they may enlarge their mar-
ket outlets.
Another positive aspect of the MFA is that it allows LDCs to re-
strain imports and thus prevent competition within their domestic mar-
kets. Such action enhances the expansion of the LDC textile industry
and enables it to become self-sufficient within a shorter time period. As
the LDCs' textile industries become self-sufficient, the developed coun-
tries can protect their own domestic industries without fear of dramati-
cally disrupting world economic development. Another benefit of the
MFA is its broad coverage of all three major fiber groups, ze., cottons,
blends, and man-mades. The Agreement enables textile producers to
plan on a sounder, long-term basis.1 6 1 Such planning is invaluable in
avoiding unforeseen disruption of domestic industry.
An additional positive consequence of the MFA is its impetus for
change in developed countries' textile production. In other words, as the
economic development of the LDCs progresses their demand for more
sophisticated goods, including advanced textiles, must also increase. The
growing rate of LDC imports should spur developed nations to channel
their textile resources into the production of more technologically ad-
vanced goods. In turn, a greater percentage of the market for less sophis-
ticated textiles would belong to the LDCs. As the LDCs become more
affluent, there would also be increased investment opportunities for in-
dustrialized nations.
Although this argument appears sound in theory, the choice to
change textile production depends on a choice of accompanying conse-
quences: should the developed nation endure the dramatic short-run
consequence of decreased textile employment and decline of production,
or should it overlook this consequence and attempt to realize the long-
run benefits? Obviously, the immediate consequences are difficult, if not
impossible, to overlook. That is why it must be stressed once more that
the MFA can only succeed if it advances the LDC cause slowly. Dra-
matic disruption of the developed domestic textile business could tip the
balance to an irrecoverable point.
160 GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1970/71 at 30 (1971).
161 TEXTILE WORLD, Jan. 1974, at 25.
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IV. The MFA and the Future
The recent renegotiation of the MFA reflects the overwhelming
problems of the international textile trade. Despite the protests of some
bitter MFA delegates in Geneva, the MFA was extended as of January 1,
1978 for a four-year period. 162 On December 15, 1977, a draft proto-
col 16 3 was opened for signature. An examination of the protocol illus-
trates the conflict which existed between the EEC and developing
countries.
The Textiles Committee created the draft protocol and reached sev-
eral important conclusions. 164 The Committee noted that certain coun-
tries encountered practical difficulties in implementing the MFA which
seriously affect the trade and economic development of LDCs. This un-
satisfactory situation could adversely affect international cooperation in
the trade field and could have unfortunate repercussions on trade rela-
tions. Hence, the protocol recognizes the need for equilibrium in rela-
tions between developed countries and LDCs.
The protocol also recognizes two major results of the renegotiation
which will have an important impact on the MFA: (1) renewed reliance
on bilateral agreements, and (2) jointly agreed reasonable departures
from the MFA's stated 6% annual growth rate. The Committee agreed
that all such departures would be temporary and would be made with
the intent to return to the MFA framework in the shortest possible time.
The Committee also urged participants to move promptly to negotiate
mutually acceptable solutions in the spirit of the MFA.
These two major results raise several key questions. One must ask
whether the "reasonable departure" clause will irreparably damage the
developed country-LDC trade relationship. The EEC gained reductions
in imports of certain sensitive products for the next five years.165 LDCs
expressed their concern that a precedent had been set in allowing excep-
tions without restraints of time or scope. 166 Other LDCs described their
acquiescence as making "the best of a bad job" and choosing "the lesser
of two evils."' 16 7 There will be damage to the LDC textile industry.
LDCs are depending on a return to the MFA within the shortest possible
time period and are relying on the TSB to guard the Agreement's rules.
As long as the developed countries utilize the reasonable departures to
rectify their domestic problems in a short time, the trade balance can be
improved in the near future.
The success of the textile arrangement may well depend on whether
the United States will also seek reasonable departures. Although the
162 Id. Jan. 1978, at 23.
163 ITC MULTIFIBER, supra 9, at A-38.
164 Id. at A-39 to A-40.
165 Id. at 23-27.
166 Id. at 27.
167 Id. at 23, 27.
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U.S. government is attempting to mediate the interests of both sides, the
U.S. textile industry may renew its pleas for more protection. 68 The
obvious danger of this move will be further restrictions on LDC exports,
but it may yet be necessary to allow the U.S. textile industry to recover.
With "reasonable departures" from the MFA and renewed depen-
dence on bilateral agreements, can the TSB effectively continue to con-
trol restraints on trade? The draft protocol reaffirms that the TSB
should continue to function effectively. However, it will be increasingly
difficult to monitor restrictions created outside the MFA framework.
This difficulty is apparent when one notes the EEC attitude towards the
TSB. The EEC believes that the TSB is "an organ of conciliation and
not an arbitral or judicial body" and that it therefore cannot question
the Common Market's new bilateral agreements.' 69
The deviations from the MFA may cause the Agreement to lose its
efficacy as its coverage thins. It is obvious that the consequences of an
ineffective MFA or no multilateral agreement at all could be disastrous.
Most participants agree that a complete failure to renew the MFA would
mean increased protectionist measures through unilateral restrictions.170
Besides harming the LDCs, these restraints will also delay industrial re-
structuring in the importing countries.' 7 ' Furthermore, lack of an MFA
would mean that some European nations might be forced to invoke
GATT Article 19, which allows nations to impose import curbs in case of
domestic injury. Widespread use of Article 19 could create chaos in the
world textile market.' 72 Failure to maintain order in world textile mar-
kets would have wide-reaching repercussions across the whole spectrum
of international trade. 73
Nevertheless, the fact that the MFA was renewed, albeit with two
major deviations, shows promise for the world textile trade. In view of
the existing textile trade situation, participating countries recognized
that the MFA could not be renewed unchanged unless bilateral agree-
ments were allowed.' 74 If the reasonable departures enable developed
countries to rejuvenate their textile industry and immediately reopen
closed markets, the LDCs will again be able to expand exports. In addi-
tion, the four year extension of the MFA ensures stability in the textile
market. It will be easier to plan ahead and avoid the unforeseen ex-
penses of an uncertain, chaotic market.
168 Id. at 27.
169 Id.
170 DNR, supra note 8, July 21, 1977; London Financial Times, July 26, 1977, at 33.
French government officials and textile industry executives agree that France could increase
protectionist measures if the MFA fails. DNR, supra note 8, July 27, 1977. Great Britain also
will not hesitate to impose unilateral restrictions on imports if the MFA is not renewed to its
liking. Id.
171 London Financial Times, July 26, 1977, at 33.
172 DNR, supra note 8, Nov. 9, 1977.
1'3 London Financial Times, July 26, 1977, at 33.
174 DNR, supra note 8, Nov. 23, 1977.
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The recent renewal of the MFA indicates that the participants must
advance cautiously in order to maintain the balance between LDCs and
developed countries. The MFA is now at a critical point. Major devia-
tions from its framework threaten to upset its efficacy and throw the
world textile market into chaos. In that case the MFA would be little
more than a shell unable to control reasonable departures and bilateral
agreements. Therefore, it is imperative that the TSB be allowed to oper-
ate as a safeguard and that all participants regain a spirit of equity and
compromise. In its first four years, the MFA appears to have operated
much too forcefully for the interests of the LDCs. In the future it must
continue to represent textile expansion, but regulate its growth to pre-
serve the domestic industries of developed countries. If both sides of the
conflict realize that the only victory can be achieved through favorable
international textile trade, then a commitment should exist to continue the
MFA.
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